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To mark the 10th anniversary of Nature Climate Change, we asked a selection of researchers 31 
across the broad range of climate change disciplines to share their thoughts on notable 32 
developments of the past decade, as well as their hopes and expectations for the coming years 33 
of discovery. 34 
Veronika Eyring: Data-driven yet physics-aware climate modelling  35 
Over 20 years ago, the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) of the World Climate 36 
Research Programme (WCRP) started with the coordination of a handful of early-generation 37 
atmospheric models coupled to a dynamic ocean, a simple land surface, and thermodynamic 38 
sea ice. Across the years, climate models have continued to be developed, and the number of 39 
CMIP models has substantially increased. In the past decade, many have been extended into 40 
Earth system models that in addition to physical climate simulate interactive carbon and other 41 
biogeochemical cycles important to climate change. Compared to earlier generations, CMIP6 42 
models have increased spatial resolution (horizontal resolution of about 1º latitude and 43 
longitude) and improved physical process representation (like clouds and land 44 
biogeochemistry), and they include additional Earth system processes (for example, nutrient-45 
limitations on the terrestrial carbon cycle) and components (such as ice sheets). Benchmarked 46 
with an increasing wealth of observations, the simulation of recent mean climate has improved 47 
in CMIP6 compared to previous CMIPs. 48 
Nevertheless, uncertainties in climate projections remain. For example, the range of simulated 49 
effective climate sensitivity - the change in global mean surface temperature for a doubling of 50 
atmospheric CO2 - has not decreased since the 1970s. It is still between 2.1 and 4.7°C, even 51 
increasing in CMIP6. A major cause of this is differences in how models simulate clouds and 52 
other processes occurring at spatial scales smaller than the model grid resolution. Simulating 53 
these processes explicitly is too computationally intensive, so they are approximated in global 54 
models through parameterizations, which are simplified mathematical representations of more 55 
complex behaviour. Additional uncertainty arises from the carbon cycle’s response to climate 56 
warming and to increased atmospheric CO2. This impacts models’ ability to accurately project 57 
global and regional climate change, climate variability, extremes and impacts on ecosystems 58 
and biogeochemical cycles.  59 
New approaches are required that exploit opportunities from increasing computational power 60 
while building on and expanding the knowledge gained from theory and observations in past 61 
decades. I expect breakthroughs in particular from the combination of three research areas: 62 
high-resolution simulations that can resolve small-scale and fast processes, the wealth of 63 
observational data, and machine learning (ML) techniques.  64 
Combining multi-disciplinary expertise in ML and process-based modelling has huge potential. 65 
High-resolution, cloud resolving models (horizontal grid resolution of a few km) alleviate many 66 
biases of coarse-resolution models for deep clouds and convection, wave propagation and 67 
precipitation, but they cannot be run at climate timescales (multiple decades or longer) due to 68 
computational costs. And even these simulations still use parameterizations for smaller-scale 69 
processes like shallow clouds, turbulence or microphysics, which are key to Earth's energy 70 
balance and climate. Short simulations from high-resolution models together with observations 71 
can serve as information to develop ML-based parameterizations that are then incorporated into 72 
Earth system models. This can drive a paradigm shift in current Earth system modelling and 73 
analyses towards a new data-driven, yet still physics-aware, science. The key goal is a hybrid 74 
modelling approach that maintains physical consistency and realistically extrapolates to unseen 75 
 
 
climate regimes while reducing climate projection uncertainties and improving Earth system 76 
understanding. 77 
The application of ML to better understand and model the Earth system is still in its infancy. It is 78 
a promising field that requires a new generation of scientists being trained at the interface of 79 
climate science and artificial intelligence. I cannot wait to see their contribution! 80 
Vimal Mishra: Hydroclimate and its changing extremes 81 
 82 
A warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, and this thermodynamic relationship is 83 
important for understanding the global hydrological cycle’s response to warming. The past 84 
decade of research has confirmed that global water vapor is increasing at ~7% per ºC, but that 85 
global precipitation increases less, around 1–3%. Research aimed at understanding this 86 
discrepancy has afforded some of the most robust and theoretically supported predictions for 87 
hydroclimate: at the global scale, these moisture changes make the tropics and polar regions 88 
wetter and the subtropics drier. As a result, subtropical dry zones are expanding and pushing 89 
the adjacent extratropical storm tracks poleward. 90 
 91 
The past decade has also highlighted that at the regional scale, hydroclimate changes are still 92 
highly uncertain, mainly driven by climate model disagreement in how regional climates respond 93 
to warming. Placing better constraints on future circulation patterns and storm systems will 94 
alleviate some of this uncertainty. Particularly important at these scales are precipitation 95 
extremes; the heaviest rainfall events are exponentially more sensitive to warming, and this is a 96 
product of changes to both temperature (thermodynamics) and regional circulation (dynamics). 97 
Understanding how local precipitation will change or intensify with warming relies on continued 98 
improvement in observations and climate modelling. 99 
 100 
Another important aspect that has come out of the last decade of research is a more 101 
fundamental understanding of and appreciation for land–atmosphere interaction, including the 102 
response of vegetation to higher temperatures and atmospheric CO2. This is exemplified by 103 
prolonged droughts that impact local water availability. Several regions, including the intensively 104 
irrigated Indo-Gangetic Plain, have witnessed frequent droughts in the past decade; continued 105 
work on the connections between the biosphere and atmosphere is necessary to more 106 
accurately estimate future water availability and demand. 107 
 108 
The past decade has also seen important advances in understanding the impact of hydroclimate 109 
on the land surface. Flash floods, particularly in urban regions, can affect transportation, 110 
infrastructure, and local economies. Atmospheric rivers and prolonged wet spells cause large-111 
scale floods that impact agriculture. Land surface conditions, including soil moisture, play an 112 
essential role in these outcomes, and the role of climate change on flood extremes is better 113 
understood thanks to improved hydrological modelling and observational networks. An 114 
important next step here is constraining the sensitivity of streamflow and surface water to 115 
warming, particularly in mountain regions where seasonal runoff can comprise a large fraction of 116 
local water resources. 117 
 118 
Reflecting on this last decade, three advances typify the gains that I find most exciting in 119 
hydroclimate research. First, new in situ and satellite-based measurements of the hydrological 120 
cycle have helped the field more comprehensively understand the hydrological cycle’s 121 
sensitivity to warming. The Gravity Recover and Climate Experiment (GRACE) and the follow-122 
on (GRACE-FO) mission, for example, have allowed researchers to see underground and 123 
 
 
measure changes in groundwater storage. Second, a recent and growing focus on urban 124 
hydrology has enabled researchers to better describe and study the interactions between 125 
hydroclimate and the built environment. Third, ongoing developments related to improvements 126 
in physical processes and resolution in global climate and impact models have helped answer 127 
some of the most challenging questions on changing risks to hydrological cycle extremes in a 128 
warmer world. Together, these areas will continue to progress understanding of regional 129 
hydroclimate change, and its impacts, in the decade to come. 130 
Gary Griffith: Coming to recognize marine ecosystems as 131 
complex adaptive systems 132 
The last decade has seen revolutionary advances in understanding how climate change impacts 133 
- including ocean warming and acidification, sea level rise and the intensification of extreme 134 
events - affect marine ecosystems and the essential services they provide to human society. 135 
The encouraging advance that resonates with me is that marine ecosystems and human 136 
interactions with them are becoming increasingly recognised as complex adaptive systems in 137 
which small changes from climate change threats and human stressors can be magnified 138 
through non-linear interactions that scale-up and play out across space, time, ecological and 139 
social organization. This calls into question the fundamental paradigm of a stable linear world 140 
that guides current conservation and sustainable marine management.  Instead, in the changing 141 
world, the possibility of sudden and unexpected shifts in marine resources, an increased 142 
potential for tipping points, alternative stable states, and the emergence of novel adaptation and 143 
evolutionary strategies can be expected. 144 
During this next decade, a big question for me is how to evolve the complex adaptive systems 145 
perspective to understand how to increase the resilience of marine ecosystems that provide 146 
critical sustainable (e.g., fisheries) or conservation (e.g., marine protected areas) ecosystem 147 
services. Resilience in this context is the emergent adaptive capacity of the ecosystem to 148 
absorb the cumulative effects of global climate change and human stressors. Key questions 149 
remain on how resilience scales in time and space with the complex interactions of both climate 150 
change (e.g., ocean warming, ocean acidification, sea level rise) and local human stressors 151 
(e.g., fisheries, pollution and human-induced introduction of alien species). Can some of the 152 
exciting data-driven causal inference methods and developments from network science be 153 
sensibly applied to tease out those key causal interactions? It remains to be understood which 154 
of those causal interactions will result in amplified or mitigating effects, whether they are stable 155 
or dynamically changing, and how that impacts on positive feedback interactions. Continuing 156 
advances in ocean robotics and the combination of remote and in situ observations combined 157 
with research initiatives such as the Decade of Ocean Science will provide the quality and 158 
amount of data for the sophisticated mathematical approaches needed to consider dynamic 159 
complexity. 160 
I also see that the complex adaptive systems framework and its evolving techniques can help us 161 
understand questions related to difficult “triage” decisions on the allocation of finite resources to 162 
preserving critical ecosystem services. A feature of anthropogenic climate change realised from 163 
 
 
the last decade of research is that previous strategies to escape climate change effects through 164 
evolutionary adaptation, refugia and migrations may not work. Understanding whether many of 165 
our current and planned conservation strategies such as “safe operating spaces” or “climate 166 
refugia” are appropriate is a critical question. 167 
I am excited that in the next decade it seems increasingly possible to step out of our comfort 168 
zone and focus on addressing the complex changes. In my own area of research, I anticipate 169 
that changing our conservation and sustainable management paradigm to also include dynamic 170 
complexity will help us develop realistic strategies to avoid further erosion of marine biodiversity 171 
and to help rebuild critical marine life. 172 
Lei Chen: Phenology and climate change, looking back and 173 
moving forward 174 
Phenology is the study of the relations between climate and periodic biological events. Because 175 
phenology is especially sensitive to climate variations, changes in phenology – including shifts 176 
in flower and leaf opening in plants, and changes in animal migration timing- has provided the 177 
first clear visible signals of how global climate change influences living organisms.  178 
Over the past decade, one of the most notable developments has been the increasing numbers 179 
of phenological data networks all over the world. It is exciting to see local citizens sharing 180 
numerous timely phenological observations online via notebooks or mobiles. These site-181 
monitoring observations provide detailed insights into organisms’ phenological responses to 182 
climate change from small to broad spatial scales. For example, by 2020, citizen scientists have 183 
contributed more than 24 million phenological records of plants (e.g., leaf-out and flowering) and 184 
animals (e.g., bird migration and frog calling) to the USA National Phenology Network.  185 
In addition, phenological records are far more diverse and comprehensive than previously 186 
expected. For instance, automatic digital pheno-cameras and camera traps are increasingly 187 
being used over a broad spatial scale, improving data reliability and quantification. Advances in 188 
remote-sensing technology over the past decade have enabled more detailed and 189 
comprehensive (global-scale) monitoring of land surface phenology. Historical patterns of 190 
phenology across species and geographic regions are also being incorporated by using 191 
specimen-based data. The micro-core sampling method has been extensively used to detect 192 
the intra-annual growth dynamics of tree stems in response to climate change. 193 
Despite these technological advances and expansions of data sources, many key questions 194 
related to climate-phenology relationships remain unanswered and it remains unclear how 195 
phenology will continue to change under future climate warming. For plant species in temperate 196 
forests for example, warmer temperature in spring may stimulate earlier leaf-out or bud break. 197 
However, as many plants must first experience sufficient cold temperature before they break 198 
dormancy, the effects of warmer winters may delay spring leaf-out or flowering. In this context, 199 
will spring phenology continue to advance under future climate warming scenarios? Similarly, 200 
 
 
both advances and delays in autumn phenology of plants have been observed during the past 201 
decade.  202 
A core issue is that the multiple stimuli and mechanisms involved in phenology remain poorly 203 
understood. There are therefore urgent needs to elucidate how biotic and abiotic stresses, such 204 
as temperature, photoperiod, snow cover, water and food availability, habitat loss and 205 
fragmentation, influence the phenology of plants and animals. In addition, phenological 206 
responses to climate change may vary between sexes, populations and species, and little is 207 
known about ecosystem-level consequences of such phenological mismatches. More studies 208 
are also needed to understand variations in climate-phenology relationships among multiple 209 
phenological stages in different taxa and seasons, effects of phenological changes on 210 
organisms’ fitness, trophic interactions, as well as phenological effects of genomic variations 211 
and their interactions with environmental changes.  212 
On the one hand, global warming has led to the shifts in phenology across multiple taxa. On the 213 
other hand, changes in phenology - particularly that of plant producers- may in turn drive further 214 
climate change. However, we have limited knowledge of potential feedback effects of warming-215 
driven shifts in changes in phenology on the climate system. Therefore, increasingly deep and 216 
integrated multi-disciplinary co-operation in phenological studies is both required and 217 
anticipated in coming decades. 218 
Trevor F. Keenan: The terrestrial carbon sink and its feedback to 219 
climate 220 
It is said that there are decades where nothing happens, but for those focused on the terrestrial 221 
carbon sink and its feedback to climate this past decade certainly has not been one of them. 222 
The fields involved have dramatically changed over the past ten years, driven by a confluence 223 
of technological advances, theoretical developments, and the widespread embrace of open 224 
science practices. The result has been a deluge of observations and derived products, and a 225 
more holistic understanding of the role of the terrestrial biosphere in the Earth System. 226 
Technological and data science advances, combined with the recent move toward open science 227 
practices (such as depositing data and code in repositories), have colluded to vastly increase 228 
the amount and quality of observations available for public use, and have lowered the barrier for 229 
researchers around the world to advance the science. Large national research initiatives such 230 
as the National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON) and the AmeriFlux Management 231 
Project in the US, and many others globally, were funded in the past decade with a mandate to 232 
provide harmonized and quality-controlled observations from 100s of carbon cycle 233 
measurement sites for broader public use. In tandem, technological advances are making novel 234 
sensors more widely available, such as methane flux sensors based on optical spectroscopy, 235 
forest structural measurements from LiDAR, airborne hyperspectral measurements of canopy 236 
characteristics, and fluorescence sensors that provide information on photosynthesis. Not to 237 
mention the expanding constellations of Earth observing sensors from both the worlds space 238 
agencies and a growing private industry. 239 
 
 
The resulting data deluge has led to a more holistic understanding of the terrestrial carbon sink, 240 
by facilitating the integration of theory with observations of different components of ecosystems 241 
and their feedbacks to the climate system. For example, plants and microbes were previously 242 
examined primarily in isolation, but their interactions are increasingly recognized as important 243 
for understanding whole-ecosystem regulation of the carbon sink. We are learning that 244 
individuals and ecological communities adapt to change, particularly through advances in eco-245 
evolutionary optimality theory, and that they work together to sequester a large proportion of 246 
emissions. Much remains unknown however about the degree to which ecosystems can adapt 247 
to ameliorate the impacts of a rapidly changing climate, how long they will continue to sequester 248 
carbon, or how long-term ecological change will feed back to the climate system. 249 
The increased accessibility and diversity of available data has also created challenges. The 250 
ease with which complex statistical approaches can now be applied to large datasets means 251 
that collaborations must include the right expertise to avoid misinterpretation of results. This is 252 
important, as the resulting data products typically lack real-world ecophysiology and often, by 253 
design, have incorrect assumptions embedded (e.g., photosynthesis is commonly and 254 
incorrectly assumed to not respond to CO2). The challenges involved are more than offset by 255 
progress resulting from the holistic understanding provided for understanding long-term 256 
changes in the terrestrial carbon sink, but the new data paradigm emphasises the need for 257 
graduate training focused on both ecophysiological theory and data science skills.  258 
Merritt R. Turetsky: Permafrost Thaw  259 
The past decade of research on permafrost thaw has been a community effort, with research 260 
networks around the world changing the way we do science. Long described as the “glue of the 261 
Arctic”, permafrost creates the literal foundation that affects most life in the Arctic and its 262 
presence regulates water, energy, and nutrient cycling. Storing more than twice as much carbon 263 
as is currently held in our atmosphere, permafrost is a legacy of past climate but almost 264 
certainly will play a role in shaping our climate future. When I began my research career 20 265 
years ago, we knew just enough to be concerned about the uncertain fate of permafrost carbon. 266 
Because we knew little, the value of every new study was high. Over the past decade, enough 267 
data became available that research networks took up a synthesis charge. These efforts have 268 
improved our confidence on some issues, but have opened up new questions and uncertainties. 269 
 We have learned that permafrost emissions are unlikely to occur as a carbon or methane 270 
“bomb” but rather will be more sustained. While they will remain smaller than anthropogenic 271 
emissions, permafrost emission could impede our ability to achieve emission reduction targets. 272 
Future research is thus likely to focus on global and regional permafrost change hotspots – 273 
related to both the pace of thaw and the magnitude of emissions. To achieve this, we need to 274 
move beyond temperature as the core of permafrost monitoring, assimilating for example new 275 
spatially-explicit information on ground ice content or Yedoma carbon stocks. Several other 276 
challenges await- multi-scale measurements of atmospheric carbon dioxide and methane have 277 
created heightened awareness of cold season emissions; no longer can we rely solely on 278 
understanding from summertime studies. Global models are powerful tools, but none deal with 279 
 
 
permafrost complexity. These models need to tackle the challenges of representing fine-scale 280 
thaw mechanisms and reducing uncertainties related to Arctic vegetation, which could offset 281 
thaw-related carbon losses. Earth history provides an actual record of past climate and 282 
permafrost change, yet we currently lack a framework for how to use permafrost responses to 283 
previous interglacials as an analogue to today’s rapid warming.  Innovation will come from 284 
merging understanding from paleo-permafrost reconstructions, modern observations across 285 
spatial scales, and future projections of permafrost change. 286 
The next decade of permafrost research will be even more convergent. We need to translate 287 
permafrost knowledge for community planning and to make projections over more policy-288 
relevant time frames. Permafrost is shaped not only by climate but also by human behavior and 289 
land use.  Placing permafrost thaw in a socio-ecological framework will move our questions into 290 
the realm of adaptation and management. We must stay focused on using broader climate 291 
policy to keep as much permafrost as possible frozen. But where we know permafrost is likely to 292 
thaw in the near-future, can anything be done?  Can we, or should we, modify surface 293 
conditions or alter fire management to slow thaw rates? Can we modify soil microbes or 294 
vegetation to minimize carbon loss or maximize ecosystem carbon uptake? These questions 295 
feel uncomfortable now, but because we know so little in this context the value of every new 296 
study will be tremendous.  297 
Sally Brown: Be prepared to expand and retreat to adapt to sea-298 
level rise 299 
Pioneering a new product can take years of development. In the last decade, we have 300 
witnessed the birth of climate services and improved methods for adapting to rising sea-levels. 301 
In this product life cycle, we have shifted from the ‘introduction’ to ‘growth’ stage, as damage 302 
from sea-level rise increases. This may make adaptation sound like a business opportunity, but 303 
the willingness to adapt has been recognised: The Bangladesh Delta Plan, a giant sea-wall 304 
proposed around Jakarta, climate-smart developments though community and ecosystem 305 
resilience in Palau and other small islands, and storm surge barriers under construction world-306 
wide are a few examples. 307 
In ten years, our knowledge of sea-level has become more targeted. Instead of numerous 308 
projections with large uncertainties, we have come to understand what is important surrounding 309 
uncertainty, such as high rates of melt from the Greenland Ice Sheet. Big data in both climate 310 
and socio-economic development have enabled more detailed and local impact assessments. 311 
Society has gained an appreciation for nature based solutions to sustain and improve resilience 312 
of vulnerable communities – solutions that mitigate climate change and help reverse the 313 
ecological crisis. 314 
Big questions for the future fall under the themes ‘expand’ and ‘retreat’. As population and blue 315 
growth in towns and cities has expanded, the amount of reclaimed land, especially in Asia, has 316 
been growing. But will this reclaimed land offer protection against sea-level rise? Can atolls be 317 
artificially raised? Are there sufficient sand resources for reclamation and nourishment? Can 318 
 
 
nature based solutions expand sufficiently to protect coastlines? Can we expand the resolution 319 
of digital elevation data for improved impact modelling? For those experiencing frequent 320 
flooding or at threat from erosion, what are the mental health impacts? 321 
Retreat offers other challenges: If ice sheets rapidly retreat, will we see a step-change in sea-322 
level rise, and if so when? With rising groundwater, erosion and flooding, how can we prepare to 323 
retreat? How will low-lying islands and deltas cope, where there are limited places to retreat to, 324 
whilst preserving cultural values? How can the world’s poorest areas increase their resilience so 325 
their livelihoods are not eroded? 326 
Moving into the United Nations Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development and 327 
targeting the Sustainable Development Goals, we need to answer these questions around our 328 
ecological, sustainable and inclusive values. Inclusivity applies to all scientists across all career 329 
stages, but especially for nations that are projected to suffer most. Academic studies are lacking 330 
in many African nations, which needs urgent attention. For all nations, new science needs to 331 
include education, support for local residents to be able to sustain livelihoods as the coast 332 
changes, plus educating politicians that controlled retreat may be essential. 333 
Regardless of mitigation, we are committed to adapt to sea-level rise. Over the next ten years, 334 
for places that need to adapt but are not yet ready, I would like to see greater open and 335 
accessible data that is interpretable for those with a range understanding and skills relating to 336 
coastal change and adaptation, and inclusion of new multi-scale coastal change models where 337 
appropriate, so the right decisions can be made at the right time. Adapting to sea-level rise 338 
takes many guises, and growth and integration in all disciplines and nations is needed to help 339 
those at risk adapt. 340 
Frank Jotzo: Successes and future of climate policy  341 
A decade ago, keeping warming to two degrees seemed all but impossible. The Stern Review 342 
instead focussed on three degrees. Global CO2 emissions grew by 31% over the century’s first 343 
decade. Things look better now. Emissions grew by about 10% from 2010 to 2019. Net zero 344 
emissions has become a rallying point, and the “below 2 degrees” ambition seems no longer 345 
outlandish. What has changed? One major factor is technology. The cost of important zero-346 
emissions technologies has fallen far faster than any mainstream projection anticipated. Solar is 347 
now the cheapest form of energy in many places of the world, and wind power not far off. 348 
Energy storage is becoming much more affordable and electric car technology has made leaps 349 
that were unimaginable a decade ago. Low-carbon pathways are open to all countries. 350 
 351 
The other is that businesses now see the shift to zero-emissions systems as an opportunity, and 352 
in any case see it as inevitable given observed climatic changes. Many governments view 353 
climate action as a way to reap macroeconomic benefits from a new investment drive. We can 354 
see it in some of China’s growth strategy, Europe’s ‘green deal’, and President Biden’s agenda. 355 




Add to this the practical experience that emissions reduction policies typically don’t hurt. Much 358 
analytical effort has gone into designing policies to minimize economic costs, and ways to avoid 359 
making politically influential players worse off. Governments have implemented them, and they 360 
work. Carbon pricing is effective, and emissions trading schemes have typically performed at 361 
lower prices than expected. Many other policies are in place, from process regulation to 362 
innovation support and demand side measures. They are usually effective and don’t seem to 363 
affect economic growth. There are other benefits, from cleaner air to industrial modernization.  364 
 365 
The research community needs to make sure that analysis, and the advice that flows from it, is 366 
not hobbled by outdated assumptions. Too many of the models used for climate policy 367 
assessment have economic and technological pessimism baked into them, by low-balling 368 
substitution options and future technology improvements. Too often modellers use outdated 369 
technology cost assumptions and omit co-benefits of cutting emissions. And too rarely do 370 
modelling scenarios cover a truly broad range of future possibilities.  371 
 372 
Research is needed on how to bring about decarbonization of heavy industry, trade in zero- 373 
emissions energy, emissions reductions in agriculture, carbon uptake on the land, and how to 374 
prepare for technological carbon dioxide removal. More knowledge is also needed on how 375 
policies can support effective climate change adaptation across the spectrum. 376 
 377 
A huge policy challenge ahead is the decline of coal, oil and gas. As these industries shrink, we 378 
will see economic and social disruption, concentrated in some regions and countries. It is a 379 
breeding ground for political polarization which fossil fuel lobbies and opportunistic politicians 380 
can stoke. Research on how policy can make transitions smoother will become more important. 381 
Finally, we need to keep in mind that climate change is deeply integrated with development. 382 
Transformations to zero emissions systems will be made only if they help people achieve a 383 
reasonable standard of living. And they will take place while climate change already affects a 384 
large share of the world’s population. 385 
Frances C. Moore: The Expanding and Maturing Field of Climate 386 
Change Economics 387 
When I began my PhD a decade ago, climate change economics was an extremely niche area. 388 
Just a few topics dominated – especially discounting and the relative merits of different climate 389 
policy instruments– and the number of researchers was small, incommensurate with the scale 390 
of the environmental, economic, or policy challenges that climate change presents. However 391 
since then the field has broadened, deepened and strengthened links to climate science.  392 
Notably there has been an explosion of studies documenting the sensitivity of social and 393 
economic systems to temperature. This literature, using statistical approaches designed to 394 
identify causal relationships in non-experimental data, has uncovered the effects of temperature 395 
across a wide range of outcomes: conflict risk, pre-term birth, classroom learning, as well as 396 
overall economic productivity across many sectors. This discovery of pervasive and, in some 397 
 
 
cases, large temperature impacts, even in wealthy countries, is a sharp break with previous 398 
work which understood effects to be mostly limited to a few highly-exposed sectors such as 399 
agriculture and coastal infrastructure. 400 
Important advances have come from questioning assumptions underlying the cost-benefit 401 
assessment of climate policy. Ten years ago, conventional wisdom held that substantial 402 
emissions reductions by 2050, required to limit warming to less than 2°, could not be justified on 403 
a cost-benefit basis. Many studies now show that this finding is overturned under alternate but 404 
justifiable models of how climate change affects the economy and human welfare. Two 405 
prominent examples are the question of whether climate change affects the underlying growth 406 
rate of the economy, and disentangling risk and time preferences in the utility function. 407 
A welcome development has been growing interest across the entire economics discipline, with 408 
scholars from labor, development, macro, health, and financial economics working on questions 409 
of weather and climate. Even more important has been recognition of systemic climate risk 410 
within major financial institutions.  Central banks, institutional investors, and credit-ratings 411 
agencies direct capital investment flows and manage economic risks and will play a critical role 412 
structuring future adaptive transitions. Markets, communities, households, and businesses will 413 
have to adapt both to a continuously changing climate and to a low-carbon economy. Forward-414 
looking regulations and investments that anticipate these changes will lower the costs of these 415 
transitions. 416 
I see several important areas still in need of substantive work. Firstly, an assessment of 417 
alternative policy instruments that better incorporates the political and technological feedbacks 418 
that will accompany major climate policy. Economists tend to favor carbon pricing because of its 419 
cost-effectiveness. But how do pricing policies perform given a richer representation of other 420 
relevant market failures or real political constraints? Examples include subsidy-driven declines 421 
in technology costs or strategic interest group dynamics, where policies themselves create or 422 
undermine powerful interest groups and therefore alter the space of political possibility. 423 
Collaboration with engineers and political scientists can help address these questions. An 424 
expanded focus on desirable policies for low- and middle-income countries, essential to meet 425 
ambitious decarbonization goals and which present distinct challenges, is also critical. 426 
More work is needed on understanding climate damages, particularly those that fall outside of 427 
traditional market measures, such as losses of cultural heritage, conflict risk, or biodiversity loss. 428 
These are extremely difficult to value and are not adequately incorporated into current estimates 429 
of aggregate climate damages such as the social cost of carbon. Also critical is understanding 430 
the transition and adjustment costs associated with a continuously changing climate. Too many 431 
studies estimate equilibrium damages or assume cost-less adjustment. But infrastructure is 432 
long-lived and natural-hazards are already under-priced in many property markets. In this 433 
context, climate change risks creating stranded assets, price bubbles, and unsustainable 434 
liabilities for local or even national governments, all of which could add substantially to climate 435 
change cost estimates.   436 
 
 
Sander van der Linden: Behavioural Insights 437 
Acceptance of anthropogenic climate change varies widely around the world. From perception 438 
to action, there has been tremendous progress over the last ten years in our collective 439 
understanding of the social, cultural, political, and psychological factors that shape individual 440 
views about climate change. For example, an important advance has been our ability to 441 
combine high-resolution geospatial data with survey data on human cognition. This has helped 442 
answer questions such as whether people are accurately perceiving local and global 443 
environmental changes, the extent to which perceptions of extreme weather patterns impact 444 
climate change concern, and how prior beliefs about the world impact understanding of climatic 445 
change. More generally, through large meta-analyses, we have accumulated a wealth of 446 
knowledge on key determinants of people’s belief in climate change, such as public perceptions 447 
of the scientific consensus on climate change.                448 
At the same time, the chasm between belief and action remains. Medium-sized correlations 449 
between climate change beliefs and individual and collective action to mitigate the problem has 450 
led some scholars to suggest that scholarly work on beliefs should be abandoned, and focus 451 
shifted toward interventions that can change behaviour directly. I remain hesitant about such 452 
recommendations. For example, consider that whilst behavioural interventions that directly 453 
target social norms have seen relative success, what underlies the efficacy of many of these 454 
interventions are changes in  beliefs about what others believe. In other words, second-order 455 
normative beliefs. Attempting to change behaviour without understanding the beliefs and 456 
motivations that underpin people’s decision-making risks short-term success over long-term 457 
failure.                                       458 
Looking to the future, one of the most exciting and important areas focuses on how to sustain 459 
changes in beliefs and behaviours over time. Despite some progress, very little is known about 460 
the long-term effectiveness of interventions as most studies do not include longitudinal 461 
measurements. Do people forget climate information over time because of real-world 462 
interference or do they lose motivation to sustain belief and behaviour change? I look forward to 463 
research which better integrates such cognitive and motivational explanations and moves 464 
beyond single-dose exposure in a controlled laboratory setting to evaluate the effect of repeated 465 
campaign messages in real-world environments.                                                                           466 
In addition, I hope for more engagement from colleagues who conduct neurophysiological 467 
research. Although they might not see the immediate relevance of their work to climate change, 468 
the next frontier needs to answer difficult questions such as, do fearful messages about climate 469 
change actually elicit differential neural activity? What physiological changes are experienced 470 
when people engage with climate change stimuli? Are risk-reward centres of the brain active 471 
when people evaluate climate change risks? Existing work in other areas, such as health, has 472 
already started to look at how survey and neuroimaging data diverge in predicting people’s 473 
responses to persuasive messages.               474 
Lastly, there is a need to shift from intention-based research to more policy-relevant and 475 
impactful behaviours that have the technological potential to mitigate climate change. Although 476 
 
 
those behaviours are more difficult to study and change, our theories need to explain how 477 
people make costly mitigation and adaptation decisions in ecologically-valid settings across 478 
diverse cultures. Doing so will not only advance the behavioural sciences but also make our 479 
insights more integral to climate policy.   480 
Box 1 Contributors  481 
 482 
Veronika Eyring heads the Earth System Model Evaluation and Analysis Department at the German 483 
Aerospace Center (DLR) Institute of Atmospheric Physics, and she is Professor and Chair of Climate 484 
Modelling at the University of Bremen. She served as Chair of the CMIP Panel during 2014–2020 through 485 
the World Climate Research Programme. 486 
Vimal Mishra completed his PhD in hydrology and water resources at Purdue University. He is an 487 
associate professor in Civil Engineering and Earth Sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), 488 
Gandhinagar. His research focuses on understanding the impacts of climate change on water resources 489 
and hydrologic extremes. 490 
Gary P. Griffith is a research scientist at the Norwegian Polar Institute and a visiting Research Fellow at 491 
the Levin Lab, Princeton University, Ecology and Evolutionary Biology. His research focuses on applying 492 
complexity science to investigating anthropogenic climate change and human stressors on marine 493 
ecosystems.  494 
Lei Chen completed his PhD in Ecology at Hokkaido University and Postdoctoral training at Texas Tech 495 
University. He is a distinguished research fellow at the College of life Sciences, Sichuan University, 496 
China. His current research mainly focuses on how global climate change influences plant growth and 497 
vegetation ecosystems. 498 
Trevor Keenan is an ecosystem scientist with a background in mathematics. His interests are centered 499 
on understanding the terrestrial carbon sink and feedbacks to climate, by integrating ground observations 500 
of land surface dynamics with models and remote sensing data. He is an Assistant Professor at UC 501 
Berkeley, and Faculty Scientist at Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. 502 
Merritt R. Turetsky is an ecologist and carbon cycle scientist who has worked in permafrost landscapes 503 
for more than two decades.  She is the Director of the Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research and a 504 
professor in the Ecology and Evolutionary Biology Department at the University of Colorado Boulder.  Dr. 505 
Turetsky is equally passionate about northern ecosystems and the people who rely on them. 506 
Sally Brown researches coastal change and climate change adaptation at Bournemouth University, UK 507 
and is an Affiliated Member of Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. Her research addresses 508 
global to local scale issues across different geomorphic settings. 509 
Frank Jotzo is a professor of climate change economics at the Australian National University. He is 510 
contributing to the IPCC’s Working Group III and the 6th Assessment Report, and has played roles in 511 
climate change policy assessments and advice in Australia and other countries. He is joint editor-in-chief 512 
of the journal Climate Policy. 513 
Frances C. Moore is an assistant professor in the Environmental Science and Policy Department at the 514 
University of California Davis. Her research helps quantify the risks climate change poses for human 515 
 
 
wellbeing, and informs the design of adaptation and mitigation policy. Her training and research bridge 516 
the fields of climate science and environmental economics. 517 
Sander van der Linden is a social psychologist who studies human judgment, communication, and 518 
decision-making, especially in the context of climate change attitudes and behaviours. He is currently 519 
Professor of Social Psychology in Society, and Director of the Cambridge Social Decision-Making Lab at 520 
the University of Cambridge. 521 
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